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Students of international security affairs ha/e long been 
concerned about the diffusion of military power and the implica­
tions of that diffusion Much has been written about the 
diffusion of power, or the spread of military power from the 
great to the middle, up-and-coming, and not-so-great powers On 
the nuclear level, the potential problems arising from the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons may have received more than 
adequate attention On the conventional level, much attention 
has been devoted to the phenomenon of arms transfers, with a 
focus on transfers, whether grants or sales, from the advanced 
industrial countries of the North to the developing countries of 
the South While researchers concentrating on nuclear prolifera­
tion have been concerned about both the transfer of nuclear 
technology and the indigenous development of nuclear weaponry, 
however, those focusing on the horizontal proliferation of 
conventional armaments have devoted much of their attention to 
arms transfers, thereby neglecting what is by far the most 
important aspect of conventional proliferation the growth of 
defense industries m  an increasing number of developing coun­
tries 1
The objective here is not only to focus attention on the 
emergence of defense industries in the third world, but to 
place this recent development in the context of North-South 
political-military relations and the third world's historical 
military dependence upon the North In contrast to the views
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expressed by other observers, 2 I will argue that the third 
world*s defense producers are indeed reducing the level of their 
military dependence upon Northern powers —  they are not merely 
substituting technological dependence for arms import depen­
dence Furthermore, I will attempt to demonstrate that the 
increasing self-reliance of the developing world*s arms manufac­
turers undermines the world military hierarchy and portends 
decreased major power (1 e , Northern) control over the South 
The third world*s upstart arms producers have already challenged 
the market dominance of established Northern arms manufacturers, 
thereby altering the structure of the international arms market 
It is quite evident that policy makers m  the advanced industrial 
countries, including the United States, will increasingly have to 
come to terms with a more differentiated world military hierarchy 
and more self-reliant and autonomous actors m  the third world
THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THIRD WORLD CAPABILITIES
Seeking to reduce their dependence upon imported Northern 
arms, a number of developing countries established domestic arms 
industries during the post-World War II period The number of 
third world countries manufacturing weapons, the range of weapons 
produced, and the quantity of military equipment produced all 
increased tremendously during this period, especially during the 
1970s Most importantly, much of the progress that has been made 
is based not simply on imported technology, but on indigenous 
research and development efforts ^
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In 1950, only four developing countries were producing any 
of the four types of major conventional weapons (1 )aircraft,
(2)armored vehicles, (3)missiles, and (4)naval vessels 4 By 
1960, contrary to SIPRI's claim that "In 1960, virtually no third 
world country possessed the capacity to produce major arms —  
with the notable exception of Argentina and Brazil, " 5 fifteen 
developing countries were manufacturing at least one of the four 
types of major military equipment. Not only were Argentina and 
Brazil engaged m  the domestic production of arms, so were other 
countries such as Israel, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Thailand, 
Singapore, Chile, Peru, and Colomoia There was little increase 
in the number of arms manufacturers during the 1960s —  m  1970 
only eighteen developing countries could be counted among the 
arms producers The major increase in weapons production came 
during the 1970s By 1980, twenty-six developing countries were 
producing major weapons systems
Of the four types of conventional weaponry, only two, 
aircraft and naval vessels, were being produced m  1960 —  seven 
countries were producing aircraft and thirteen were building 
naval vessels By 1970 all four types of weapons were being 
produced seven countries were producing aircraft, four were 
manufacturing armored vehicles, and fifteen were building naval 
vessels In 1970, however, only one country, India, was manufac­
turing each of the four kinds of weapons But by 1980 six 
countries —  Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, South Korea, and 
South Africa —  were producing each of the four types of wea-
3
pons The twenty-six third world defense producers in 1980 
included fifteen aircraft producers, six armored vehicle manufac­
turers, nine missile producers, and twenty-four naval builders
There has clearly been a marked increase in arms production 
by developing countries since 1950, with the most impressive 
advances made during the decade of the 1970s Yet there has been 
not only an increase m  the number of third world countries 
building their own military equipment, there has also been a 
significant increase in the range of weapons produced within each 
of the four categories and, most importantly, m  the level of 
indigenous content
Aircraft production in 1960 centered around basic propeller- 
driven trainers and much of the "production" merely amounted to 
assembly of foreign aircraft or production under license By 
1980, however, not only were eleven developing countries manufac­
turing trainers (five of which were the result of domestic R&D), 
five countries —  India, Israel, North Korea, South Africa, and 
Taiwan —  were building jet fighters Another eleven countries 
were either assembling or manufacturing helicopters and five 
Egypt, India, Israel, South Africa, and Taiwan —  were building 
aircraft engines
Neither armored vehicles or missiles were being built m  the 
third world in 1960 Yet by 1980 five countries —  Argentina, 
Brazil, India, Israel, and South Korea, were producing tanks 
Argentina, India, South Korea, and South Africa were manfactunng 
armored personnel carriers, and Brazil"s Engesa was producing the
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popular, domestically designed Cascavel and Urutu wheeled armored 
vehicles Missiles being built in the third world by 1980 
included surface-to-air missiles (Brazil, India, Israel, South 
Africa, and Taiwan), air-to-surface missiles (Argentina, Brazil, 
and Israel) , air-to-air missiles (Brazil, India, Israel, South 
Africa, and Taiwan), surface-to-surface missiles (Israel, South 
Korea, and Taiwan), and anti-tank missiles (Argentina, Brazil, 
E9ypt, India, Israel, Pakistan, and Taiwan) Most importantly, 
nine of the nineteen different missiles being manufactured by 
Argentina, Brazil, Israel, South Africa, and Taiwan were based 
upon indigenous R&D
More developing countries have built naval vessels than any 
other type of military equipment Not surprisingly, naval 
production has centered around patrol craft Eight countries 
were building patrol craft in 1960 By 1980 the number of 
countries building patrol craft had risen to twenty Of the 
twenty, thirteen countries were building indigenously designed 
vessels The twenty-four producers of naval vessels m  1980 also 
included four countries —  Argentina, Brazil, India, and North 
Korea —  building frigates and two —  Argentina and North Korea 
—  building submarines
It is quite evident that arms production by developing 
countries has increased substantially since 1960 The 1970s 
especially saw a surge in both the number of countries producing 
weapons and range of weapons being produced Most significantly, 
this increase has come about through indigenous R&D as well as
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through the acquisition of foreign military production techno­
logy By 1980 eighteen developing countries had advanced to the 
stage at which production of either aircraft, armored vehicles, 
missiles, or naval vessels was based on domestic R&D.
MILITARY DEPENDENCE
Underlying the initiation of these defense manufacturing 
programs has been the common desire to reduce dependence upon 
imported military equipment The military dependence of develop­
ing countries upon the advanced industrial countries has been the 
fundamental basis of North-South political-military relations 
during both the colonial and post-colonial periods Historical­
ly, developing countries have not only been at the bottom of the 
world military hierarchy in terms of military strength and 
potential, they have also been dependent on Northern inputs for 
the components of military power they do possess
Preceding formal political independence, indigenous military 
establishments of the then colonies were fully integrated into 
those of the colonial powers Local militaries were commanded by 
colonial officers and were financed, trained, and equipped by the 
colonial powers Procurement of military equipment within the 
colonial territories was either impossible given the absence of a 
manufacturing capability or limited to small arms and ammunition 
or non-lethal supplies such as uniforms m  a very few colonies 
The sole significant local input was human —  only manpower was 
generated locally
6
The new countries were thus left m  a state of military 
underdevelopment at the dawn of independence. Revenue collection 
systems required to raise funds to finance the armed forces and 
other state operations either did not exist or were unreliable 
Few capable commanding officers were available —  colonial 
training had emphasized the following of orders and administra­
tive skills over generalship and initiative. And, most signifi­
cantly, domestic sources of military equipment were nonexistent 
The absence of a viable military infrastructure served to 
exacerbate the wide variety of security problems confronting the 
newly independent countries The artificial nature of many of 
these countries generated both domestic and international 
conflict Seldom conforming to nationality or other traditional 
groupings, the new countries were a crazy patchwork quilt of 
diverse national, ethnic, tribal, and religious groups that were 
often at odds with one another The lack of correspondence 
between state and nation made internal conflict virtually 
inevitable National, ethnic, tribal, and religious groups 
previously united in the struggle to oust colonial rulers came to 
contend for state power and dominance Various ideological 
factions, which had sublimated their differences and colla­
borated in the ouster of foreign rule, turned on one another m  
the attempt to establish and maintain control of the state 
apparatus Priorities were often assigned not to the construc­
tion of a viable state or to the necessities of nation-building 
but to the more primordial groups that, despite the conflicting
7
claims of modernization/ still laid claim to the loyalty tradi­
tionally expected of members
The poor fit between state and "nation/" or society, has 
contributed to conflict among as well as within the new coun­
tries Sovereignty over particular territories and peoples has 
often been subject to dispute State boundaries established by 
the former colonial powers are ill-defined and ill-conceived, 
often splitting lands traditionally occupied by particular 
communal/ethnic communities between two or more sovereign 
countries, leaving such communities without a clear homeland and 
the source of international disputes Territorial disputes 
reinforced by territorially divided communal groupings have been 
a primary contributing cause of inter-developing country con­
flicts
To deal with these long-term, nonreceamg threats to their 
continued existence, the newly established states were left with 
inadequately trained and equipped armed forces, forces that had 
been mere appendages of far-flung imperialist military establish­
ments Despite the withdrawal of direct external political and 
military control, the new states remained m  a position of 
military dependency, a dependency most dramatically evidenced by 
reliance upon external sources of military equipment Confronted 
with external military threats and often even more threatening 
domestic conflict, possessing poorly equipped armed forces, and 
devoid of the mdustnal/technological base required to produce 
essential military equipment, developing countries had little
8
alternative but to import massive amounts of foreign military 
hardware to equip their armed forces Local production capabili­
ties being virtually nonexistent, developing country dependence 
upon arms imports from the advanced industrial countries became 
the defining characteristic of North-South military relations
The bonds of military dependence between specific developed 
and less developed countries were largely historically deter­
mined Though there were exceptions, developing countries tended 
to acquire arms from their former colonizers during the immediate 
post-colonial period Having served with and been trained by 
core militaries, many developing country militaries were reluc­
tant to sunder the close ties established between the armed 
forces of the core and the periphery under colonialism Mili­
taries accustomed to command by a foreign military elite and the 
equipment,training, and operating procedures of that elite were 
typically disposed to turn to their former rulers for arms, 
thereby perpetuating the colonial military relationship Former 
British colonies, for instance, imported military equipment from 
Britain, while the former French possessions turned to France
The supply policies of the developed countries served to 
foster developing country dependence upon Northern arsenals 
Though commercial purchases have assumed increasingly greater 
significance, during the 1950s and 1960s developing countries 
were often able to obtain arms from the two dominant suppliers, 
the United States and the Soviet Union, through grant aid or 
other financially attractive means Most of U S arms transfers
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to the developing world during the 1950s were m  the form of 
grant aid The U S military assistance grant program totaled 
$42 billion ( m  current dollars) during the years 1946-1970 and 
was still $2 2 billion m  1970.6 The Soviet Union has supplied 
arms on extremely generous terms, offering forty percent dis­
counts, eight to ten year loans at the far below market rate of 
merely two and one-half percent, and accepting payment in soft 
currencies and even commodities 7 Though U S grant aid fell to 
only $265,000 by 1976 (and was virtually terminated by the 
International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 
1976) and the Soviet Union toughened the terms of its arms sales 
—  reducing the number and size of grants and often requiring 
payment in hard currencies8 —  by having provided arms through 
grant aid or at bargain basement prices, the two leading sup­
pliers had discouraged the pursuit of alternative weapons 
acquisition strategies Providing military equipment at low or 
no cost reduced the incentive to initiate costly self-reliance 
programs Increasing the cost disparity ratio between arms 
imports and self-reliance made it difficult to justify the more 
costly route, especially in the face of economic development 
goals Military dependence was thus made to look relatively 
benign Once hooked on foreign arms, developing countries have 
not found it easy to break away and sever the umbilical cord 
linking them with Northern suppliers
Many developing countries, however, soon came to recognize 
the vulnerabilities and limitations inherent m  dependence upon
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foreign arms suppliers As S Rajaratnam, Singapore's Foreign 
Minister, put it in an address before the United Nations General 
Assembly
the most dangerous consequences are political 
The flow of arms carries with it a measure of 
dependency on the part of the client on the seller 
of arms not unlike that prevailing under the old 
imperial system The massive flow of arms to
the third world confronts it with a new danger 
It is, first of all, a drain on the economies of 
third world countries, but even more important is 
the fact that it creates a new form of dependence 
on the great Powers, which can exploit the third 
world's dependence on them to manipulate them, to 
engineer conflicts between them, and to use them 
as proxies in their competition for influence and dominance y
The greatest danger to developing country national security 
posed by military dependence is the threat of arms embargoes 
Military supplies can be cut off at the whim of capricious 
suppliers Embargoes, especially during ongoing hostilities, 
severely restrict military autonomy and independence Developing 
country vulnerability to arms embargoes has been demonstrated on 
a number of occasions In September 1965, the U S and Britain 
both imposed embargoes following the outbreak of the Indo-Pakis- 
tani conflict of that year Pakistan at the time was almost 
entirely dependent on American equipment During the 1971 Indo- 
Pakistani war, the U S again exercised its power to cut off 
supplies Despite the U S "tilt" toward Pakistan, Pakistan as 
well as India was subjected to an arms embargo Export licenses 
for more than $3 million worth of military equipment bound for 
Pakistan were cancelled and $11 3 million worth of military and 
other "sensitive equipment" earmarked for India remained undeli-
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vered 10 In 1967, France, a major supplier, terminated Israeli 
arms supplies following the Six Day war The United Nations m  
1963 imposed a voluntary arms embargo on South Africa, which was 
eventually followed by the mandatory embargo of 1977 More 
recently, Argentina's invasion of the Falkland Islands in April 
1982 prompted the European Common Market to cut-off arms supplies 
to the South American country*
Developing countries have had to contend with interruptions 
m  the flow of spare parts, upon which the continued operation of 
foreign equipment is dependent, as well as interruptions m  the 
supply of complete weapons systems In 1973 the British refused 
to supply spare parts for Israel's Centurion tanks After 
Sadat's expulsion of Soviet advisers m  1972, the Soviet Union 
refused to provide needed spare parts for Egypt's Soviet weapon­
ry, prompting Sadat to characterize much of his military equip­
ment as "nothing but scrap - 1 1  The United States refused to 
supply Khomeini's Iran with spare parts for its Grumman F-14 
fighters in 1981 during the stalemated Iran-Iraq war Of Iran's 
seventy-seven F-14s, only nine were reported to be serviceable m  
December 1981 ^
Foreign arms purchases bring not only arms but also the 
foreign technicians and advisers required to maintain often 
sophisticated systems and to tram third world militaries m  the 
use, repair, and maintenance of those systems, thus injecting an 
irksome and sometimes insidious external presence into the core 
of the national security apparatus Singapore's Minister of
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Foreign Affairs and Robin Luckham have both pointed out the 
dilemmas inherent m  introducing foreign weapons and the fol­
lowing train of advisers and technicians According to Foreign 
Minister Ra;jaratnam,
The weapons now being imported are not only highly 
sophisticated but also packaged as parts of a very 
complex,, very comprehensive and very expensive 
weapons system When a country buys a weapon sys­
tem it imports not only weapons but a whole array 
of experts and advisers Arms contracts today in­
clude provisions for training, technical support 
and the establishment of facilities to maintain 
and repair equipment Often these contracts in­
clude provisions for foreign experts to build 
roads, communication networks and other facilities 
which come under the term infrastructure
Luckham has written that
The implications of military training and assistance 
programs for external dependence are easy to see 
They tram soldiers m  the use of the technologies 
of the donor countries They give sustenance to the 
social relations of force around which the profes­
sional armies of both metropolis and periphery are 
organised They create networks of professional 
contacts both with the metropolitan military insti­
tutions and among course-mates m  different peri­
pheral countries And they are often explicitly 
intended to promote the political philosophy 
and interests of the country which provides the training
The presence of foreign advisers and training missions not only 
follows in the wake of arms imports but also reinforces military 
dependence by institutionalizing corporate and personal ties 
between the armed forces of the core and periphery
In addition to suspending deliveries of weapons and spare 
parts and complementing arms transfers with personnel transfers, 
arms suppliers have often imposed restrictions on the end-use of 
military equipment The United States, for instance, has
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traditionally provided military equipment on the condition that 
it be used solely for defensive purposes Turkey*s use of 
American arms in the invasion of Cyprus in 1974 resulted m  the 
cancellation of ü S military aid and assistance m  1975 And 
before Portugal had divested itself of its last African colonial 
holdings, both West Germany and Italy had prohibited Portuguese 
use of their arms in Africa.^
Suppliers have also imposed restrictions on the resale of 
military equipment Prior approval of retransfers has long been 
a part of U S. arms transfer policy In order to avoid unknowing 
participation m  triangular deals, France, West Germany, and 
Switzerland have also forbidden retransfers without their prior 
permission ^  When Saudi Arabia expressed interest m  purchasing 
ü S F-14S from Iran after the overthrow of the Shah and the 
seizure of the American embassy m  Teheran, the ü S halted the 
deal Even the sale of foreign military equipment containing 
U S supplied components is subject to ü S approval, as Israel 
discovered when it attempted to sell its American-engmed Kfir 
fighter to Ecuador and Taiwan
Militarily dependent developing countries must also contend 
with the attempts of supplier states to exert influence on the 
domestic and foreign policies of recipients The prospect of 
obtaining influence has been a major incentive underlying 
developed country arms transfers m  the first place Arms 
transfers have long been used as a means of gaining access to 
political and military leaders, shoring up alliance commitments,
14
and instituting friendlier relations, all m  the hope of ac­
quiring leverage As Barry Blechman and his former ACDA col­
leagues have observed
The recipient's dependency on the donor for 
maintenance, spare parts, and replacement of 
major items of military equipment is seen to 
provide leverage m  difficult situations The 
arms donor need not actually threaten to cur­
tail supplies because the two superpowers know 
that this dependency will influence recipient's 
decisions long before the donor would need to contemplate such threats 18
Arms transfers have played a prominent role in the post-world War 
II ü S -Soviet competition for influence in the third world 
Both superpowers have supplied developing countries with the 
expectation, and often requirement, that recipients of their 
unbounded, disinterested generosity align themselves politically 
and militarily with the supplying country In the Middle East, 
the U S has often manipulated arms supplies in its efforts to 
prevent peace negotiations from collapsing, providing Israel with 
F-15S and other weapons in return for its approval of the 1975 
Sinai accords, and selling F-5s to Egypt in 1978 to keep Sadat 
from breaking off talks with Israel 19 The United States has 
also manipulated the flow of arms to countries judged to be 
violators of basic human rights In 1974 the U S Congress 
adopted legislation terminating arms sales and military assis­
tance to Chile following reports of the severe repression carried 
out by the military junta that had overthrown Salvadore Allende 
Concern for human rights played a central role in the Carter's 
administration's arms sales policy In its first year in office,
15
the Carter administration reduced the flow of arms to countries 
such as Argentina, Uruguay, Ethiopia, all of which had been cited 
as extreme human rights violators in the administrations first 
report on human rights Latin American countries especially were 
selected as targets in Carter»s drive to manipulate military 
dependence as a means of exerting pressure on foreign leaders to 
lower the level of domestic state violence and repression ^0
ARMS PRODUCTION AND MILITARY DEPENDENCE
It is not surprising that an increasing number of third 
world countries have begun to manufacture their own weaponry m  
an attempt to reduce, and hopefully eliminate, their dependence 
upon arms imports Yet it is not clear that substituting locally 
manufactured for imported arms has enabled, or will enable, 
developing countries to reduce the level of their military 
dependence upon the advanced industrial countries of the North
The expansion of defense production by third world countries 
has relied heavily upon Northern military technology Indeed, 
the developing world's defense industries were founded upon 
imported technology and many products continue to incorporate 
foreign components According to some authors, therefore, there 
has merely been a change in the form of military dependence as 
developing countries have turned from arms imports to local 
production In their view, domestic production has not contri­
buted to the attainment of military self-reliance Cahn, 
et al , have claimed that "Instead of creating independence,
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indigenous production usually creates a new set of dependen­
cies "21 Stephanie Neuman has written that " self-sufficiency 
m  weapons production is beyond the reach of less developed 
countries. Domestic production creates other dependencies n22 
According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
" . the dependence normally associated with arms transfers does
not disappear with the establishment of domestic defense indus­
tries. 1,22 Michael Moodie has argued that
Third World dependence associated with arms 
imports from industrial countries does not dis­
appear with the creation of local defense in­
dustries, the form of the dependence is changed 24
The nature of dependence is transformed from one 
of reliance on industrial producers for arms to 
dependence on them for inputs to make arms 25
Third World arms producers have traded one form 
of dependence for another They have shifted the 
nature of their requirements from the need for 
finished weapons systems to the need for the tech­
nologies to manufacture those systems 26
Lock and Wulf have gone so far as to argue that
The import of sophisticated capital-intensive 
technology and especially the establishment of com­
plex arms production programmes increases the de- 
n suppliers from industrialised coun-
And Wulf has concluded that
for the time being there is no short-term or 
even medium-term fulfillment of the desire of 
developing countries to reach a high degree of 
self-sufficiency in arms production 28
Thus the apparent consensus seems to be that as developing
countries substitute locally manufactured weapons for imported
weapons, technological dependence is merely being substituted for
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import dependence Instead of reaching their proclaimed goal of 
military self-reliance, developing countries are simply exchang­
ing dependence upon foreign arms supplies for dependence upon 
foreign military technology
More is occurring than merely a change m  the form of 
military dependence, however The nature of military dependence 
undergoes a subtle but potentially profound transformation as 
developing countries turn from arms imports to arms production 
Instead of merely importing a finished product, developing 
countries have begun to import and assimilate the technology 
necessary to produce, and eventually develop, weapons domestical­
ly Consequently, developing countries have been acquiring the 
means to alter the traditional North-South dependency relation­
ship
A static dependency relationship is unavoidable when arms 
are imported But as developing countries establish arms 
production programs and import defense technology rather than 
simply arms, a more dynamic relationship is established, one that 
has an inherent potential for the reduction, if not elimination, 
of military dependence The authors cited above have failed to 
recognize this crucial difference between dependence on arms 
imports and dependence on technology imports the former 
engendered a static dependency relationship while the latter 
results m  a dynamic relationship Importing military technology 
has enabled developing countries to build arms industries that 
will eventually provide the bulk of required military hardware,
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thus greatly reducing the need for foreign military equipment. 
As more experience is acquired in the development and production 
of weapons, developing countries will also become increasingly 
less dependent upon foreign military technology Texas Instru­
ments' J Fred Buey was right on the mark when he wrote in a 1976 
Defense Science Report, "The release of technology is an irrever­
sible decision Once released, it can neither be taken back nor 
controlled The receiver of know-now gains a competence which 
serves as a base for many subsequent gams n2  ^ Dependence on 
foreign military technology can be overcome in the long-term just 
as technological dependence m  other industrial sectors can be 
superseded Thus the transfer of military technology from the 
advanced industrial countries of the North to the developing 
countries of the South has set in motion a process that may well 
result in a rather dramatic reduction of military dependence As 
Steven Spiegel has written on the subject of technology transfers 
intended to aid the establishment of local defense production 
capabilities
This kind of assistance has the greatest effect 
of any kind of military aid on a consumer's 
power in the long run, both m  terms of military 
capability and in terms of economic spin-off on 
domestic industries and the ability to produce 
arms for export The political implications of helping a nation to produce its own arms are also 
far reaching Once a country has gained this 
capacity, an increased level of political inde­
pendence and increased freedom to pursue its own 
foreign policy goals is implied 31
19
Military Self-Reliance
Indeed, leading third world arms producers such as Brazil, 
India, Israel, South Korea, and South Africa have already been 
able to reduce substantially the degree of their dependence upon 
foreign arms and technology Brazil especially has made tremen­
dous strides In 1970, ¡just a year after Embraer, Brazil's 
premier state-owned aircraft manufacturer, had been founded, only 
about forty percent of the Brazilian Air Force's fleet was of 
local origin 32 By the mid-1980s, the situation was quite 
different In 1984, approximately seventy-seven percent of the 
Brazilian Air Forced total inventory of 740 planes and helicop­
ters had been produced in Brazil The tactical, maritime, 
transport, and training commands were all dominated by 
Brazilian-built aircraft Most importantly, all 280 aircraft on 
order m  1984 were to be procured from Brazilian firms 33 in 
addition, Brazil by the early—to-mid—1980s no longer needed to 
import armored cars, armored personnel carriers, wheeled armored 
fighting vehicles, light tanks, rockets and missiles, and small 
naval vessels Not surprisingly, Brazil 's arms imports fell from 
a high of $285 million m  1979 to only $28 million by 1982 At 
the same time Brazil's arms exports rose from $46 million m  1975 
to $589 million by 1982 34
India also has made notable progress m  its efforts to 
nationalize arms procurement Some sixty-three percent of the 
Indian Air Force's over 1500 aircraft in 1984 had been built by 
Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, India's state-owned aircraft
20
manufacturer 33 Even though India has acquired several hundred 
Soviet T-54 and T-55 tanks, the domestically produced Vijayanta 
comprised sixty-five percent of the Army*s tank force in 1984 3i> 
In addition, India was in the process of acquiring domestically 
built destroyers, frigates, corvettes, jet fighters, and helicop­
ters m  1984 37
Despite its special relationship with the United States and 
its reliance upon American weaponry and the presence of U S 
troops, South Korea too has had success m  nationalizing arms 
procurement South Korea, like Brazil, invested heavily m  
defense industries during the 1970s As a result, according to a 
U S Congressional Budget Office Study, fifty percent of all 
required military equipment was being produced m-country by 
1978 By the early 1980s, seventy percent of the weaponry
needed by the Korean armed forces was being manufactured local­
ly Again like Brazil, South Korea*s arms imports have been
declining and its arms exports rising Arms imports fell from 
$678 million m  1978 to $358 million m  1982 while arms exports 
rose from $70 million m  1978 to $400 million in 1982 40
Due to the rapid economic growth of the 1970s, South Korea 
has also assumed the financial burden of its own defense 
Whereas in fiscal year 1966 the U S provided the funds for 
eighty-five percent of Korean defense expenditures, by fiscal 
year 1976 the U S was providing only twelve percent of the 
country * s military expenditures —  and two-thirds of the funds 
provided by the U S  in FY 1976 were in the form of Foreign
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Military Sales credits that would be repaid 4  ^ By FY 1977 South 
Korea was " funding essentially all of its defense costs " 42 
While American troops remain m  South Korea (though in declining 
numbers since the late 1960s), South Korea has clearly demon­
strated its ability to reduce its dependence upon the United 
States
Brazil, India, and South Korea are not alone Other 
developing countries that have made substantial progress m  
combating military dependence include Argentina, South Africa, 
Israel, and Taiwan South Africa has become virtually self-
sufficient and arms are no longer imported in significant 
quantities 43
Obviously, not all developing countries have become, or can 
become, self-sufficient The need for imported military equip­
ment remains Yet that need is far less acute than formerly 
The situation for an increasing number of developing countries 
compares more favorably with that of many industrialized coun­
tries Thirty-percent, for instance, of the defense contracts 
entered into by Italy m  1980 were for foreign military equip­
ment Over one-third of the military equipment purchased by 
Sweden during the 1970s was imported 44 Britain, West Germany, 
Italy, and other West European members of NATO, like third world 
arms producers, continue to import some of the arms their 
military forces require Many advanced industrial countries, 
again like third world arms producers, also manufacture military 
equipment under license Britain, for instance, produces French
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Milan anti-tank missiles and American AIM-9 surface-to-air 
missiles, TOW anti-tank missiles, and Harpoon submanne-to-ship 
missiles, while Italy builds French Roland-2 surface-to-air 
missiles, Milan anti-tank missiles and a whole array of American 
missiles, helicopters, and armored personnel carriers ^  Thus 
the sources of military equipment for the third world's arms 
producers and the advanced industrial countries are not terribly 
dissimilar
SELF-RELIANCE IMPLICATIONS FOR WORLD ORDER
The emergence of defense industries m  the third world 
signifies that some developing countries have at last begun to 
3 0m  the ranks of those countries capable of producing the 
implements of modern warfare "Modern battles," as F w Hirst 
wrote in She., political Economy of war, "are won in foundries, 
machine shops, and laboratories while developing countries
have long been exposed to the ravages of modern warfare, only 
recently have they been capable of providing themselves with the 
tools of modern warfare The industrial revolution that united 
the military and the captains of industry, resulting m  the 
industrialization of warfare, has now truly reached the 
developing world 4? Traditionally, developing countries posses­
sed modern arms only by virtue of having imported them Now, 
however, developing countries not only possess modern weapons, an 
increasing number own the means of producing them
The political-military significance of the third world's
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arms production capabilities may elude the more casual observer 
Compared to the awesome destructiveness of the superpowers' 
nuclear arsenals and the formidable array of conventional 
weaponry possessed by NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the military 
capabilities being acquired by the third world's arms producers 
might appear insignificant The relatively limited destructive 
capabilities of the third world's conventional weapons may also 
seem of slight importance m  comparison with the havoc that may 
well plague the international order as additional countries 
acquire nuclear weaponry 48
Yet the likelihood of U S -Soviet nuclear conflagration, of 
military confrontation, on either the nuclear or conventional 
level, between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, or of rapid and destabi­
lizing nuclear proliferation49 is far more remote than the 
probability of the developing world's arms producers testing 
the effectiveness of their products in battle As Robert Keohane 
and Joseph Nye have argued, even though the use of force by major 
powers has become more costly, "lesser states mvolvea in 
regional rivalries and nonstate terrorist groups may find it 
easier to use force than before " 50 Russett and Starr claim that 
smaller, less developed countries have exhibited a greater 
propensity toward risky behavior than larger, industrialized 
countries 5 1 Indeed, developing countries have repeatedly 
demonstrated their willingness to enter the fray of battle 
According to data collected by Small and Singer, of the eighteen 
interstate wars between the end of World War II and 1980,
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developing countries were involved in sixteen. In ten of these 
eighteen wars, only developing countries were involved 52 Of the 
forty-three civil wars during this period, forty-two took place 
in the developing world The advanced industrial countries 
became involved militarily in only six of the forty-three civil 
wars 52 Thus the demonstrated propensity of developing countries 
to become involved m  military conflict has been far greater than 
that of the members of either NATO or the Warsaw Pact The 
defense industrial growth with which we are concerned here has 
occurred in the most war-prone areas of the world These areas 
are also the source of the wodrlc's most rapidly increasing 
military expenditures and fastest growing military establish­
ments 54
Seemingly, the widespread aversion to the use of force
exhibited by advanced industrial countries has no parallel in the
third world Klaus Knorr has noted that
There is little evidence that Third World leaders 
are much impressed by the norms in restraint of 
military aggression that are embedded m  the United 
Nations charter and which have acquired considerable 
support in the developed democratic states. 55
That restraint is of course deeply rooted in the fear of a
nuclear holocaust Even a conventional engagement between the
North's two most powerful military blocs has apparently been
deterred by the dangers of escalation to nuclear conflict No
such built-m restraint is operational in the developing world
Iran and Iraq, for instance, have shown little reluctance to
target each other's population centers m  their ongoing war
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That five-year old war has also seen the two countries attack 
each other's economic lifelines —  oil —  and the use of mustard 
and nerve gas by Iraq
Erosion of the International Political-Military Hierarchy
The spread of conventional arms production technology to the 
developing world represents a further erosion of the rigid 
political-military hierarchy that came into existence after world 
War II First, the military superiority of the United States was 
chipped away at by the Soviet Union until the two superpowers had 
become military equals Then American hegemony over the capita­
list world was challenged —  initially by the economic recovery 
of Western Europe and subsequently by the economic recovery and 
ascendancy of Japan By the mid-1970s the United States had been 
downgraded by one observer to the level of "an ordinary country" 
that was " only first among equals, primus inter paros among 
nations " 56 The dominance of the Soviet Union over international 
communism was terminated by the monolith-shattering rise of the 
People's Republic of China Now the developing world is seeking 
to rid itself of the shackles of military (and economic) depen­
dence Military power is becoming less concentrated and more 
diffuse
While arms transfers (the primary mechanism with which 
military dependence -was maintained) from developed to developing 
countries served to maintain the world military order or hier­
archy and the dominant position of the arms supplying countries,
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the transfer of military production technology from North to 
South and the consequent establishment of nationally controlled 
defense industries in third world countries is subverting the 
world military order. Both the international military hierarchy 
and the rules of the game of the international arms market have 
been challenged by the developing world As defense production 
capabilities in the third world continue to expand and developing 
countries become less constrained, the leaders and other, lesser 
members of the two core military alliances (NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact) , who have grown accustomed to an inordinate measure of 
control over their various clients m  the developing world, will 
find it increasingly difficult to determine the course of events 
in the third world and maintain international order
Military dependence has both an enabling and constraining 
effect on armed conflict among developing countries Since those 
new countries unable to produce arms were able to import arms, 
disputes that might have been resolved without the use of force 
were instead resolved on the battlefield and armed conflicts that 
might have remained at relatively low levels were able to 
escalate into major conflicts Military dependence even exacer­
bated conflicts among and within developing countries when the 
two superpowers perceived their interests to be at stake (Korea, 
Vietnam, Ethiopia—Somalia, and Angola for instance) When major 
powers did not perceive their interests to be at stake, however, 
or when they were able to act m  concert to manage third world 
conflict, military dependence had a dampening effect The
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developing world1s dependence upon imported military supplies 
served to reduce the severity, duration, and perhaps also the 
frequency of conflict Northern arms suppliers have often cut 
off the flow of arms to third world belligerents, thereby 
stalemating, if not terminating, military conflicts Thus, for 
instance, the not infrequent conflicts between India and Pakistan 
and between Israel and its Arab adversaries were halted rela­
tively quickly, or often kept at relatively low levels of 
violence, in the case of India and Pakistan, as international 
pressure was applied at points of vulnerability
The dampening effect of military dependence will be severely 
eroded by the continuing buildup of defense industries in 
developing countries As arms production capabilities expand and 
military autonomy and independence increases m  those regions of 
the world that have most often resorted to the use of military 
force during the post-world War II period —  this despite the 
constraints imposed by military dependence —  military conflict 
may well increase m  frequency, duration, and severity 57 
Northern powers will be less effectively able to intervene in 
third world conflicts from afar by using arms embargoes or other 
forms of pressure as a means of terminating or managing conflict 
escalation In Asia, for instance, a militarily unconstrained 
North or South Korea may be more prone to attempt to bring about 
national unification through force (Thus the United States, 
despite its support for South Korea1s military self-reliance 
strategy, should perhaps be disposed to maintain its ground troop
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presence in the South to deter South Korean as well as North 
Korean aggression ) A hegemonic India that continues to display 
intransigence toward Pakistan is certain to become more assertive 
as its independent military posture improves A Vietnam with 
independent defense production capabilities could become even 
more boldly interventionist In South America, Brazil, the most 
dynamic and aggressive of all third world arms producers, has 
already attained regional supremacy and seeks future recognition 
as a major power The development of a more successful defense 
industry would bolster Argentina*s intentions to once again act 
upon its claim to the Falkland Islands In the Middle East, 
Israel has become less susceptible to u S. pressure as its 
indigenous arms production capabilities have matured And m  
Africa, South Africa has not hesitated to use the products of its 
well-advanced defense industry to safeguard its perceived 
security interests, despite the international opprobrium heaped 
upon it
Obviously, arms acquisitions, whether through domestic 
production or imports, do not inevitably lead to conflict Yet 
there is clearly cause for concern As the third world*s arms 
production capabilities expand, there will be a corresponding 
increase in the third world’s independent warfighting capabili­
ties Arms, and perhaps especially those acquired through 
independent means, can serve to exacerbate existing tensions and 
contribute to those perceptions and misperceptions likely to lead 
to war The enhanced warfighting capabilities emerging from
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local defense industries could result in third world leaders 
overestimating the strength of their militaries, becoming 
overconfident, and engaging in military adventures that might 
otherwise have been forgone 58 And gust as foreign threats may 
be used to justify investments in local defense industries, the 
very scale of the investments required may be used to justify the 
employment of the industry's products to eliminate those threats 
The work of Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, and that of 
Wallace, bears directly on the question of the nature of the 
relationship between capabilities and conflict. Singer, Bremer, 
and Stuckey59 have shown that what they have labelled the 
fluidity school, which predicts less war when there is approxi­
mate parity among the major actors, when change is m  the 
direction of parity, and when there is a fluid international 
hierarchy of power, accurately describes the nineteenth century 
What Singer, et al , termed the preponderance and stability 
school, which predicts less war when power is concentrated in 
only a few nations, when change is toward greater concentration 
of power, and when the international hierarchy is relatively 
stable or fixed, was found to fit the twentieth century The 
international system is now apparently moving from a hegemonic 
system in which power and capabilities have been highly concen­
trated and the international hierarchy relatively fixed, toward a 
system characterized by the erosion of hegemony, the diffusion of 
power and capabilities, and the erosion of the international 
hierarchy Thus it might appear that we are moving back toward
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the nineteenth century panty/fluidity model Yet the number of 
independent actors has expanded tremendously, the international 
system is no longer Eurocentric (as it was m  the nineteenth 
century), and approximate parity among even the major powers 
across relevant issue areas does not exist. In addition, while 
change is away from hegemony, it is not toward parity, and while 
the international hierarchy is less rigid than formerly, there 
are still significant barriers to entry at the upper levels 
Thus we are left with the worst of both the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries The two different sets of tendencies which 
contributed to international violence m  the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries are merging or forming a synthesis that bodes 
ill for the maintenance of world order there is neither 
approximate parity among the major powers nor a concentration of 
power in a few powers, change is neither m  the direction of 
parity nor concentration of power, and the international hier­
archy is neither fully fluid nor absolutely fixed To the extent 
that the third world's defense production capabilities contribute 
to the diffusion of power and the erosion of the post-world War 
II international hierarchy, the expansion of those capabilities 
would appear to dimmish the prospects for world order
In his study of the relationship between status inconsis­
tency and war, Michael Wallace found confirmation for the 
hypothesis that "The greater the amount of status inconsistency 
in the international system as a whole, the greater the level of 
conflict that will be experienced m  it . " 60 Wallace found
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especially strong confirmation for his hypothesis m  the case of 
inconsistencies between military capability and attributed 
status. As particular third world countries acquire greater 
independent military capabilities, external recognition (attri­
buted status) of their achievement is likely to lag behind actual 
accomplishments (status inconsistency) Major arms manufac­
turers, especially those such as Brazil and India which aspire to 
greater regional and world roles, may well be frustrated by the 
failure of the rest of the world to accord them the status they 
feel they deserve, and may consequently attempt to compelí 
recognition by demonstrating their newfound capabilities To the 
extent, then, that the developing world's production capabilities 
increase the level of status inconsistency m  the international 
system, world order will be the victim of those capabilities
Having noted "the diffusion of power to third-world coun- 
tries," Stanley Hoffmann observed that
. these countries are both more capable of 
creating difficulties by their own actions and 
more capable of depriving of their efficacy the 
instruments of power that the United States used to police world affairs m  the post-war eri 
Some believe that the effrontery of the "pygmies"
s t r?sult 0f the decllne of the United States, they do not understand that the fall is 
a direct result of the rise of the "pygmies"^
Increasingly, third world arms producers will be able to pose
difficulties for the major powers Northern powers may, for
instance, find it more difficult to project power into the
developing regions As the third world's independent military
capabilities improve, the reach of „hat Kenneth Bouldmg
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called the "loss-of-strength gradient" 63 of magor powers will be 
severely eroded Either the loss-of-strength gradient will drop 
off more sharply, or developing countries previously lying under 
the gradient will rise above it. Northern powers will thus be 
less able to progect armed force into as many areas and with as 
much effectiveness as before By bolstering its military 
capabilities, a developing country can increase the cost of an 
attack, thereby strengthening deterrence and improving its 
bargaining position 6< Magor northern powers will be less able 
to maintain order, or at least their version of order, in the 
third world gust as conflict there is likely to increase
One seemingly positive effect of conventional arms produc­
tion by developing countries is that magor Northern powers will 
no longer be as closely linked to belligerent third world 
countries as military supply ties, and political-military 
relations, are loosened One would perhaps expect that the magor 
world powers would therefore be drawn into third world conflicts 
less frequently The Northern arms suppliers, however, have 
relied upon the military supply relationship that translated into 
military dependence of the periphery upon the core as one means 
of exercising influence in the third world. As developing 
country arms producers become more autonomous and less dependent 
upon imported arms, supplier countries will be deprived of both 
the easy access to third world political and military decision 
makers and the means of manipulating those decision makers 
provided by the military supply relationship As Richard Burt
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has noted, "In the long run., indigenous production of advanced 
weapons would reduce what political influence suppliers can exert 
over recipients "«5 instead of acceptlng thls loss Qf lnfluence
ma3or Northern powers may feel compelled to supply even more 
sophisticated and advanced weaponry or resort to more direct 
forms of influencing the course of events m  the third world 
Non-arms producing developing countries may be supplied with more 
advanced military equipment than neighboring arms manufacturers 
have yet been able to produce. The tendency of the two super­
powers especially to view events in the third world with a 
distorted East-West perspective will reinforce the inclination to 
search for alternative means of influencing events m  the third 
world. Thus instead of reducing the incidence of major power 
involvement in Asian, African, and Latin American conflicts, 
conventional arms production by developing countries may well 
result m  the escalation of that involvement
While those developing countries that manufacture their own 
weapons may be able to become increasingly autonomous, the radius 
of action of those developing countries which do not produce arms 
will be even more circumscribed Third world countries that do 
not produce arms may become even more vulnerable as the defense 
industries of contiguous developing countries expand These 
countries will not only remain dependent upon and vulnerable to 
capricious foreign suppliers but will also be vulnerable to 
neighboring countries that manufacture their own military 
equipment and can more easily engage m  protracted warfare
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Restructuring of the International Arms Market
In addition to contributing to the international diffusion 
of power and influence, the rise of third world defense indus­
tries has resulted m  the restructuring of the international arms 
market. 66 Three major changes have transformed the nature of 
the international arms market First, the transfer of military 
production technology from the North to the South has become as 
important as, and the in the long run more important than, the 
transfer of arms The transfer of production technology, 
technology which has performed a crucial enabling function in the 
buildup of the third world's defense industries, is now a common 
component of arms sales agreements
The second major change has been the central concern here 
the nationalization of arms procurement by developing countries 
increasingly indigenously produced arms are being substituted for 
imported arms Major third world producers no longer provide an 
open, ready market for Northern military equipment The esta­
blished defense firms of the advanced industrial countries must 
now compete with local manufacturers, manufacturers that are 
typically sheltered from the most intense forms of foreign 
competition by protective government policies m  order to 
secure vital foreign sales, Northern firms have been compelled to 
provide not simply arms but military production technology,
technology that strengthens the competitive challenge issuing 
from Southern defense firms
The third major change has been the export of arms by the
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third world's arms producers Developing countries are producing 
arms not only for their own use but for export as well while 
arms exports by developing countries totaled only $ 1 1 3 million 
and accounted for a mere 0 6 percent of the international arms 
trade in 1972, by 1982 arms exports by all third world countries 
(producers and nonproducers alike) came to $2 . 5  billion and 
accounted for 7 4 percent of the total world trade in arms 
Exports by third world arms producers alone added up to $2 1  
billion in 1982 —  a 6.2 percent share of the world market 68 
Thus not only has the third world's share of the international 
arms trade risen dramatically (contrary to Steven Miller's 
assertion that " the developing world's share of this market 
has increased remarkably little since the early 1960s"68), 
it has been third world producers that have generated most of 
those exports (83 7 percent of third world exports in 198270).
Several third world countries have already emerged as 
important arms exporters Foremost among these are Brazil and 
Israel Brazil has sold its armored vehicles and military 
aircraft to countries all over the world, and Israel has enjoyed 
sales successes in Central and South America and Africa 
Brazil's arms exports of $589 million m  1982 made it not only 
the developing world's leading exporter, but the tenth largest 
arms exporter m  the world 71 while the exports of Brazil and 
other third world producers such as South and North Korea, India, 
and Singapore have gone primarily to other developing countries, 
Northern military markets have been penetrated as well Brazil
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has sold military aircraft to Britain and Prance and Israel has 
sold its „ares to the Omted states, west Germany, and Switzer­
land Clearly, developing countries are not simply " marginal 
producers in a rapidly expanding market "72 Though not all Qf
the third world's arms manufacturers have yet attempted to sell
their arms abroad, the early success of those that have bodes
well for the future of defense industries m  the developing 
world
The success of third world producers on the international 
market has considerably altered the structure of that market A 
simple two-tiered market existed prior to the emergence of third 
world producers and exporters in this two-tiered market the 
advanced industrial countries produced the world's supply of 
military equipment, traded weapons among themselves, and also 
sold them to the developing countries A three-tiered market 
emerged following the initiation of exports by third world 
producers Most of the world's weaponry is still produced by the 
core industrial countries and the North still exports arms to the 
South Now, however, developing country arms producers export 
arms to other third world countries, and some have even sold 
their products to the Northern advanced industrial countries
Arms Production in the Third World and Arms Control
The emergence of third world arms producers and exporters 
has serious implications for any future efforts to control the 
horizontal proliferation of conventional weaponry The numerous.
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complex problems encountered by Carter administration officials 
in their attempt to establish a regime governing the transfer of 
conventional weapons to the third world have become even more 
numerous and complex with the appearance of new sources of 
arms 73 Developing countries justifiably will be suspicious of 
measures intended to restrict the flow of weapons and military 
technology and will be able to sidestep efforts to control the 
spread of conventional arms by producing arms and exporting them 
to each other Because of the strength of commercial incentives 
to export arms, developing countries will be disinclined to 
adhere to the rules of any arms control regime established by the
advanced industrial states and intended to regulate the interna- 
tional arms trade*
The emergence of these defense industries may also have an 
adverse effect on efforts to curb the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. Not only are developing countries now producing 
nuclear-capable delivery systems such as aircraft and missiles, 74 
the independent production of modern conventional weaponry may 
actually whet the appetite for what is perceived as the ultimate 
weapon the nuclear bomb The most advanced third world 
producers of conventional arms are also those countries that are 
either known to have or are suspected of having initiated nuclear 
weapons R&D programs India, Israel, South Africa, Brazil, 
Argentina, and South Korea it is not clear that the acquisition 
of sophisticated conventional weaponry will serve as a substitute 
for the acquisition of nuclear weapons The independent develop-
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armsment, production, and procurement of advanced conventional 
may be only a prelude to the development of nuclear weapons.
Implications for American Policy
If indeed the buildup of defense industries in the third 
world and the subsequent reduction of military dependence will 
lead to a less stable or harmonious world order, what can the 
United States do to counter such developments, or at least dampen 
their effects? One's first inclination is to attack the weakest 
point in the development of the third world's defense indus­
tries the widespread use of foreign technology Northern 
defense production technology has played a crucial role in the 
growth of the third world's defense industries Can the United 
States stem the flow of this technologyto the South? Probably 
not There are simply too many countries that are willing to 
sell the needed technology in all likelihood, it would be even 
more difficult to slow the flow of technology than the flow of 
arms The Carter administration discovered just how difficult it 
is to bring the Soviet Union and other major suppliers to agree 
on curbing the international traffic in arms it would be even 
more difficult to formulate an agreement curbing the flow of 
technology The commercial incentives for established defense 
firms to provide production technology as part of arms sales 
agreements are extremely strong Many defense firms, especially 
those m  Western Europe, are heavily dependent upon foreign sales 
and are becoming ever more amenable to demands for the transfer
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of muxtary technology i„ the competitive environment of the
international arms market, sales oftentimes depend on the
willingness of sellers to provide production technology
It may be that the only way for the United States to get a
handle on the technology transfer problem is to itself become
more involved in providing military manufacturing technology By
becoming more involved in third world defense industries, the
0 8. may have greater influence upon the development of those
industries and upon determining what is manufactured, how much,
by whom, and to whom the products may be sold. Restrictions
could be imposed on the use of military equipment manufactured
under American licenses, or containing American components, and
on the sale of such equipment to third parties This is in fact
the policy the o S has already adopted in the case of south
Korea and a few other countries yet U.S leverage and influence
may still be rather limited due to the existence of multiple 
sources of technology.
The problem of declining influence is central insofar as 
the united states has acquired influence by providing arms to 
third world countries, that influence will be diminished as the 
developing world manufactures a greater proportion of the 
weaponry it requires and thereby reduces the level of military 
dependence To counter this potential loss of influence, the 
united states may have to be willing to supply even more sophis- 
ticated and advanced weaponry to third world countries than it 
has m  the past, weapons more advanced than they have yet been
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able to manufacture During the 1970s, the O S was often 
reluctant to provide the most advanced equipment to all comers. 
This was especially true for South American countries and South 
Korea Already the Reagan administration has agreed to supply a 
few of these countries, such as Venezuela, with some of the most 
sophisticated equipment m  the American inventory
Perhaps the United States should consider, however, standing 
aside for once and assuming a more enlightened role. The nature 
of North-South political-military relations appears to be on the 
verge of a profound transformation as third world arms producers 
make progress m  reducing the level of military dependence This 
transformation the reduction of military dependence and the 
emergence of more independent third world powers -  may well 
bolster American interests, if allowed to.
If, as is likely, containing Soviet influence remains the 
central concern of American foreign and security policy, as it 
has been since 1945, it should be considered whether containment 
could not be pursued more effectively by supporting rather than 
obstructing the efforts of third world countries to bolster their 
security through indigenous means Secure, self-reliant develop­
ing countries may well be more resistant to Soviet overtures and 
pressure than countries whose security is dependent upon the 
maintenance of close ties with the Western advanced industrial 
countries By acquiescing to, and perhaps even fostering, the 
buildup of defense industries in the third world, the reduction 
of military dependence, and the emergence of more independent
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third world powers, the U S would be spreading around the 
burden and the costs of containing Soviet influence and rendering 
the ü S presence around the globe less obtrusive Such a change 
m  the implementation of the policy of containment, some may 
charge, would represent a shift in emphasis from active to 
passive containment But it would also be a shift from reactive 
to anticipatory containment. The United States may well sacri­
fice a good measure of the influence it has wielded But the 
loss of American influence will not represent a corresponding 
gain for the Soviets And ü S influence will inevitably 
dimmish anyway The policy of fostering the emergence of a more 
loosely structured world order may contribute to the emergence of 
a less ordered international environment, but it may also 
contribute to an easing of the tensions resulting from the 
present form of the U S -Soviet competition for influence in the 
third world Perhaps it is time the United States stopped 
opposing so many new developments in the third world and started 
taking advantage of some of them
CONCLUSION
The emergence of third world arms producers and exporters 
poses real dilemmas for U S policy and the maintenance of world 
order The successful establishment of defense industries m  the 
developing world is enabling a growing number of developing 
countries to nationalize the procurement of military equipment 
and reduce their dependence on arms imports Military self-
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reliance for the South translates into diminished influence and 
leverage for the North The prospects for a tranquil world 
order and maintenance of the international status quo are 
diminished by the continuing diffusion of power, the erosion of 
the international hierarchy, and the increasing assertiveness of 
some third world powers. Arms exports by third world producers 
and the consequent restructuring of the international arms market 
have rendered any future efforts to control the proliferation of 
conventional arms more difficult than ever Clearly, American 
policy makers will have to take the third world’s military 
capabilities increasingly into account
43
1 Por some recent exceptions see Michael Brzoska and Thomas
Ohlson, eds., Arms Production m  the Third World, (London 
Taylor & Francis, 1985), James E Katz, ed , Arms Production in 
Developing Countries. An Analysis of Decision Making, (Lexing­
ton D C Heath and Company, 1984), Stephanie G Neuman, 
"International Stratification and Third World Military
Industries," International Organization, Voi. 38, No 1 (Winter 
1984), pp 167-197, Andrew L Ross, "Security and Self-Reliance 
Military Dependence and Conventional Arms Production m  Develop­
ing Countries," as yet unpublished Ph D dissertation,
Cornell University, August 1984, and Aaron Karp, "Ballistic 
Missiles m  the Third World," International Security, Voi. 9, 
No 3 (Winter 1984/85), pp 166-195.
2 See especially Neuman, op cit
3 Except where otherwise noted, this section draws upon Andrew 
L Ross, "Security and Self-Reliance," op cit., Chapter 4, "The 
Aggregate Data," pp 122-164
4 Neuman, op cit , p 172
5 SIPRI, World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 117.5, 
(Cambridge The MIT Press, and Stockholm Almqvist ano Wick- 
sell, 1975), p 195
6 Philip J Farley, Stephen S Kaplan, and William H Lewis,
Arms Across the Sea. (Washington, D C The Brookings Institu­
tion, 1978), p 14, and Andrew J Pierre, The Global Politics_,of 
Arms Sales. (Princeton Princeton University Press, 1982), p 46
7 Pierre, p 78
44
8. Ibid, pp 46 and 79
9 Speech by Mr Rajaratnam of Singapore, Official Records nf 
UlUteQ Rations geney?^ Assembly, Tenth Plenary Meeting, September 
29, 1976, pp 149 and 150.
10 W. Norman Brown, Tjie.,United States and india. Palemón. 
Bangladeshy (Cambridge Harvard University Press, 1972), p 224
11 Pierre, op cit., p 164
12 Richard Halloran, "Iran Rebuffed by u S in Bid for Parts for 
Its F-14S," Ifey York, Twines, December 13, 1981, p 14
13 Rajaratnam speech, op cit , p 149
14 Robin Luckham, "Militarism Force, Class and International 
Conflict," in Mary Kaldor and Asbjorn Eide, eds , The world
a n i t m  Or^er,--Ihe Impact Of Military Technology on the TM ni
í£o£ld, (London The MacMillan Press Ltd , 1979) p 241
1 5 SIPRI' Zhe Arm? with the Third Wnr1„ . (Stockholm
Almqvist & Wiksell, and New York Humanities Press, Inc , 1971), 
p 39
16 Ibid, pp 37-39
17 Pierre, op cit , p 153
18 Barry M Blechman, Janne E Nolan, and Alan Platt, "Pushing 
Arms'n EaEÇiqn Policy, No 46 (Spring 1982), p 1 39
19 Ibid, p 16, and Geoffrey Kemp with Steven Miller, "The Arms 
Transfer Phenomenon," m  Andrew J Pierre, ed , Arms Tm.f.r.
an¿ A m e r e n  Pppeiqn P m ^ y , (New York New York University 
Press, 1979), p 49
20 See Lars Schoultz, Human Rights and united states pni,m
45
T.PWard— Latin America, (Princeton Princeton University Press, 
1981), especially Chapter 6, "Military Assistance," pp 211-266
21 Anne Hessing Cahn, et al , Controlling Future Arms Trade. 
(New York McGraw-Hill Book Co , 1977), p 78,
22 Stephanie G Neuman, "Arms Transfers, Indigenous Defence 
Production and Dependency The Case of Iran," in Hossein 
Amirsadeghi, ed., The Security of the Persian Gulf- (London 
Croom Helm Ltd , 1980), p, 145.
23 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic 
Survey 1976. (London IISS, 1977), p 23.
24 Michael Moodie, "Defense Industries m  the Third World," in 
Stephanie G Neuman and Robert E Harkavy, eds , Arms Transféra 
in__the Modern World. (New York Praeger, 1979) , 301
25 Michael Moodie, "Sovereignty, Security, and Arms," The 
Washington Papers, Voi 7, No 67 (Beverly Hills and London 
Sage Publications, 1979), pp 31-32
26 Michael Moodie, "Vulcan's New Forge Defense Production m  
Less Developed Countries, Arms Control TodayP Voi 10, No 3 
(March 1980), p 2
27 Peter Lock and Herbert Wulf, "The Economic Consequences of 
the Transfer of Military-Oriented Technology," m  Mary Kaldor and 
Asb}orn Eide, eds , The World Militav Order The impact: of 
Military Technology on the Third World. (London The Macmillan 
Press Ltd , 1979), p 226 See also IFSH-Study Group on Arma­
ments and Underdevelopment, Transnational Transfer of Arms 
Production Technology, (University of Hamburg Institut fur
46
Friendensforchung und Sicherheitspolitik, 1980), pp. 87-89
28 Herbert Wulf, "Developing Countries," in Milton Leitenberg 
and Nicole Ball, eds., The Structure of the Defence Industry. 
hn, International Survey. (London Croom Helm Ltd., 1983), 
p 341
29 Quoted in Michael T Klare, American Arms Supermarket-. - 
(Austin University of Texas Press, 1984), p 167
30 See Dieter Ernst, ed , The New International Division of 
Labourr, Technology and Underdevelopment. Consequences for thg 
Third World, (Frankfort Campus Verlag Gmbtt, 1980), Heraldo 
Munoz, ed , Fjrom Dependency to Development strategia t-n 
Overcome Underdevelopment and Inequality. (Boulder Westview 
Press, 1981), and James H Street and Dilmus D James, eds , 
Technological Progress m  Latin America. The Prospects fnr 
Overcoming Dependency. (Boulder Westview Press, 1979)
31 Steven L Spiegel, Dominance and Diversity. The Interna- 
ti.onal Hierarchy, (Boston Little, Brown and Company, 1971) , 
P 135
32 Derived from data m  The. Military Balance 1970-71 . (London 
IISS, 1970), p 74
33 Derived from data m  Th_e___Militarv Balance 1984-lQfiR. (Lon­
don IISS, 1984), p 117
34 All figures are in constant 1981 U S dollars From U S 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), World Military 
Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1972-1982. (Washington, D C 
ACDA, April 1984), p 61
47
35 Derived from data in T_he__Militarv Balance 1984-1985, p 99
36 Ibid, p 99
37 Ibid, pp 99-100
38 Congressional Budget Office, Force Planning and Budgetary 
implications of U^ S.. Withdrawal from Korea. (Washington, D C 
USGPO, May 1978), p 15
39 Shim Jae Hoon, "South Korea Standing on its Arms," Far 
Eastern Economic Review. October 23, 1981, p 26
40 World Military Expen d i t u res and Arms Transfers 1972-1982. 
P 75
41 U S Embassy, Seoul, Report on Korea 1976. p io
42 ü S Embassy, Seoul, Report on Korea 1977. p 8.
43 W o r ld. Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1972-1989..
p 86
44 See Sergio A. Rossi, "Italy," in Ball and Leitenberg, 
op cit , p 220, and Per Holmstrom and Ulf Olsson, "Sweden," in 
Ball and Leitenberg, pp 147-148
4 5 See SIPRI, War Id Armaments and Disarmament SIPRI Yearbook 
L23.3, (New York International Publications Service, Taylor & 
Francis Inc , 1983), pp 338-344
46 F W Hirst, The Political Economy of War. 2nd ed , (London 
J M Dent & Sons Ltd , 1918), p 3
47 For accounts of the impact of modern technology upon warfare 
and the industrialization of war see George H Quester, Offense 
and.Defense m  the International System. (New York John Wiley &
48
Sons, 1977), Theodore Ropp, War m  the Modern World. (New York
Collier Books, Macmillan Publishing Co , Inc , 1962), Michael 
Howard, War m  European History. (Oxford Oxford University 
Press, 1976) , pp, 120-135, William H McNeill, The Pursuit of
__ Technolo<iy_r__^rmed Force, and Society Since A,D. 1000,
(Chicago The University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp 223-306, 
and Phyllis Dean, "War and Industrialization," in J M Winter, 
ed , War and Economic Development. (Cambridge Cambridge 
University Press, 1975), pp 91-102
48 On the probable consequences of nuclear proliferation see 
Lewis A Dunn, Controlling the Bomb Nuclear Proliferation m  the 
1980s. (New Haven Yale University Press, 1982), Chapter 4, 
"What Difference Will it Make9" pp 69-94, and Michael Mandle- 
baum, The Nuclear Future, (Ithaca Cornell University Press, 
1983), Chapter 3, "Nuclear Proliferation," pp 81-102
49 For an optimistic assessment of the prospects for curbing 
nuclear proliferation see George H Quester, ed , Nuclear 
Proliferation Breaking the C h a m . (Madison University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1981) Originally published as a special issue 
of International Organization. Voi 35, No 1 (Winter 1981)
50 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S Nye, Power and Interdepen­
dence___World Politics in Transition. (Boston Little, Brown and
Company, 1977), p 228
51 Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, World Politics. The Menu for 
C h o i c e . (San Francisco w H Freeman and Company, 1981), 
p 199
49
52 Derived from data compiled by Melvin Small and j David 
Singer, fieyort tp firms,— Inte.rnational and Civil wars. iRifi-igan. 
(Beverly Hills Sage Publications, Inc , 1982), pp 92-95.
53 Ibid, pp 228-232
54 Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditure 
Hál, (Washington, DC. World Priorities, 1983), p 10 See 
also Edward A Kolodzieg and Robert Harkavy, "Developing States 
and the International Security System," Journal of Internat, 
MfâiES, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Spnng/Summer 1980), pp 64-68
55 Klaus Knorr, "Is International Coercion Waning or Rising’" 
Intetnetipnaj security, voi 4, No 4 (Spring 1977), p 98
56 Richard Rosecrance, "Introduction," in Richard Rosecrance,
ed ' ftneKich ag an Ordinary ÇpuyUY___O.S. Foreign Policy and the
Futyrp, (Ithaca Cornell University Press, 1976), p 1 1
57 Also noted by Steven E Miller, "Arms and the Third World 
Indigenous Weapons Production," PSIS Occasional Papers, No 3 , 
(Geneva The Graduate Institute of International'Studies, 
Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies, 
December 1980), p 35
58 It has been suggested that war is most likely to occur when 
strength is overestimated and leaders become overconfident See 
Geoffrey Blarney, The Causes of w*rr (Ne„ York The Free Press, 
1973), pp 53-56
59 J David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, "Capability 
Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965," in
50
J David Singer and Associates, Explaining War, Selected Papers
from the Correlates of War Proiect. (Beverly Hills Sagef 1979),
PP 159-188
60 Michael David Wallace. War and Rank Among Nations. (Lexmg-
ton D C Heath & Company, 1973), P 24
61 Ibid, p 72.
62 Stanley Hoffmann, "Security m an £ge of Turbulence Means
of Response, " in Christoph Bertram, ed , Third-world Conflict and
International Security. (Hamden Archon Books, 1982) , p 65
63 Kenneth E Boulding, (^ .Q£l_ict_ and,.Defense,__A .general. T,heo.r,y,
(New York Harper & Row, 1962), p 230
64 See Michael Handel, Weak States in the International Order. 
(London Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1981) , p 258
65 Richard Burt, "New Weapons Technologies Debate and Direc­
tions," Adelphi Papers No 126, (London IISS, Summer 1976),
p 28
66 Contrary to the claims of Stephanie Neuman. See her "Inter­
national Stratification and Third world Military Industries," 
op cit , p 197
67 Also noted by the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies See IISS, Strategic Survey 1976, (London IISS, 1977), 
p 21 In addition see Michael T Klare, "The Unnoticed £rms 
Trade Exports of Conventional Arms Making Technology," Interna­
tional Security. Voi 8 , No 2 (Fall 1983), pp 68-90, and 
Stephanie G Neuman, "Coproduction, Barter, and Countertrade 
Offsets m  the International Arms Market," Orbis. Spring 1985,
51
pp. 183-213
68 All figures are in constant 1981 dollars and are derived from 
World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1972-1982 
69. Miller, op cit , p 36
70 Derived from data in Wo_rld Military Expenditures and Arms 
Transfers 1972-1982
71 Ibid.
72 Miller, op cit , p 38
73 On the problems encountered by the Carter adminsitration see 
Richard K Betts, "Tragicomedy of Arms Trade Control," Interna­
tional Security, Voi 5, No 1 (Summer 1980), pp 80-110.
74 See Maurice Eisenstein, "Third World Missiles and Nuclear 
Proliferation," The, Washington Quarterly, voi 5, No 3 (Summer 
1982), pp 112-115
52

